The Efficiency of Collective Bargaining in Public Schools by Hosken, Daniel S. & Margolis, David N.
Série Scientifique
Scientific Series
96s-10
The Efficiency of Collective
Bargaining in Public Schools
Daniel S. Hosken, David N. Margolis
Montréal
mars 1996
Ce document est publié dans l’intention de rendre accessibles les résultats préliminaires de la
recherche effectuée au CIRANO, afin de susciter des échanges et des suggestions.  Les idées et les
opinions émises sont sous l’unique responsabilité des auteurs, et ne représentent pas nécessairement
les positions du CIRANO ou de ses partenaires.
This paper presents preliminary research carried out at CIRANO and aims to encourage
discussion and comment.  The observations and viewpoints expressed are the sole responsibility
of the authors.  They do not necessarily represent positions of CIRANO or its partners.
CIRANO
Le CIRANO est une corporation privée à but non lucratif constituée en vertu de la Loi
des compagnies du Québec.  Le financement de son infrastructure et de ses activités
de recherche provient des cotisations de ses organisations-membres, d’une subvention
d’infrastructure du ministère de l’Industrie, du Commerce, de la Science et de la
Technologie, de même que des subventions et mandats obtenus par ses équipes de
recherche.  La Série Scientifique est la réalisation d’une des missions que s’est
données le CIRANO, soit de développer l’analyse scientifique des organisations et des
comportements stratégiques.
CIRANO is a private non-profit organization incorporated under the Québec
Companies Act.  Its infrastructure and research activities are funded through fees
paid by member organizations, an infrastructure grant from the Ministère de
l’Industrie, du Commerce, de la Science et de la Technologie, and grants and
research mandates obtained by its research teams.  The Scientific Series fulfils one
of the missions of CIRANO: to develop the scientific analysis of organizations and
strategic behaviour.
Les organisations-partenaires / The Partner Organizations
•Ministère de l’Industrie, du Commerce, de la Science et de la Technologie.
•École des Hautes Études Commerciales.
•École Polytechnique.
•Université de Montréal.
•Université Laval.
•McGill University.
•Université du Québec à Montréal.
•Bell Québec.
•La Caisse de dépôt et de placement du Québec.
•Hydro-Québec.
•Fédération des caisses populaires de Montréal et de l’Ouest-du-Québec.
•Téléglobe Canada.
•Société d’électrolyse et de chimie Alcan Ltée.
•Avenor.
•Service de développement économique de la ville de Montréal.
•Raymond, Chabot, Martin, Paré
•Banque Nationale du Canada
ISSN 1198-8177
 The authors would like to thank Ronald Ehrenberg, Nicole Fortin, Brownwyn Hall, George Jakubson,%
Francis Kramarz, Thomas Lemieux, W. Bentley MacLeod, Thierry Magnac and Uri Possen for helpful
comments. Any remaining errors are ours.
 U. S. Federal Trade Commission†
 Université de Montréal, CIRANO, CRDE‡
The Efficiency of Collective Bargaining in
Public Schools%
Daniel S. Hosken , David N. Margolis† ‡
Résumé / Abstract
Résumé :
Nous proposons un modèle de négociations collectives sur les salaires
et l'emploi dans le secteur public. La solution de ce modèle implique des équations
structurelles de détermination des salaires et d'emploi qui sont estimées à partir de
données provenant des conventions colléctives des écoles publiques de l'état de New
York. Notre approche a l'avantage d'englober tous les modèles majeurs de la
littérature sur les négociations collectives (syndicat monopole, droit à gérer,
négociations efficaces et négociations inefficaces) et de relier chaque modèle à une
restriction d'égalité sur un ou plusieurs paramètres estimés. Nos résultats suggèrent
que l'allocation des ressources spécifiée dans les conventions collectives des
enseignants de l'état de New York n'est, en générale, pas efficace. De plus, notre
approche nous permet d'estimer le pouvoir de négociationsur les salaires et sur
l'emploi séparément. Nous trouvons un pouvoir de négociation sur les salaires de
0.53, et sur l'emploi de 0.71. Finalement, nous démontrons l'importance de contrôler
le caractère endogène des salaires lors de l'analyse des flux des services publics dans
un marché syndicalisé.
Mots clés : Négociations collectives, contrats efficaces, syndicat du secteur
public, éducation
Abstract :
This paper develops a bargaining model of wage and employment
determination for the public sectror. The solution to the model generates
structural wage and employment equations that are estimated using data from
New York State teacher-school district collective bargaining agreements. An
advantage of this approach is that the major collective bargaining models
(monopoly union, right to manage, efficient contracting, and inefficient
contracting) are nested in the structural equations based on flexible functional
forms and these models can be empirically tested as restrictions on estimated
model parameters. The empirical results suggest that the allocation of resources
generated by collective bargaining in New York State public schools is, by and
large, not Pareto efficient. Furthermore, it is possible to estimate separate
measures of union bargaining power over wages and employment. Empirically,
it appears that union bargaining power over wages is around 0.53, while
bargaining power over employment is around 0.71. In addition, the paper
demonstrates the importance of controlling for the nature of the collective
agreement when measuring the level of public services that flow to a community
in the presence of a unionized public sector work force.
 Keywords : Collective Bargaining, Efficient Contracting, Public Sector Union,
Education
1I.  Introduction
The goal of this paper is to investigate the impact of economic, social
and institutional constraints on public sector negotiations.  Using fairly flexible
functional forms, we derive a structural simultaneous-equations model of the
bargaining process between public sector labor unions and the government in
the context of a particular government-provided service, education, while
taking into account local education demand factors, institutional constraints,
and the teachers’ union's bargaining power over wages and employment.  There
are two major advantages to this approach.  First, the structural employment
and wage equations nest the four most important collective bargaining models:
monopoly union, right to manage, efficient contracting and inefficient
contracting1 .  We can thus distinguish empirically between the different
approaches by testing hypotheses about estimated parameters.  Second, the
approach allows measures of union bargaining power to be estimated, and
bargaining power over wages and employment can be different, although this is
not imposed a priori.
We use data from New York State in 1983, 1986 and 1989 to estimate
our models.  The empirical results suggest that, given the functional form
assumptions of our structural model, collective bargaining between teachers in
New York State and their respective school boards generates resource
allocations that are neither Pareto efficient nor on the labor demand curve in
the vast majority of the cases studied.  No school district in New York State
negotiated a collective agreement found to lie on the labor demand curve.  This
result raises serious doubts about the appropriateness of using monopoly union
or right to manage models to explain collective bargaining among New York
State teachers, and perhaps more generally.  Furthermore, we find that for over
80 percent of the school districts in New York State, we can reject the
hypothesis that the collective agreement lies on the contract curve (i.e. is Pareto
efficient).  More generally, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the contract
curve is vertical, and thus any efficient contracts would be strongly efficient2 .
Our point estimates, however, suggest a slightly negatively-sloped contract
curve when evaluated at the population means.
                                                       
1 
 Some well-known attempts to distinguish between efficient contracting models and labor demand
models (monopoly union and right-to-manage) include Brown and Ashenfelter (1986), MaCurdy and
Pencavel (1986) and Abowd (1989).  See Farber (1986) for a description of the empirical implications
of these approaches to modeling collective bargaining.  See Manning (1987) for a description of
inefficient contracting and its relation to the other collective bargaining models.
2 
 The terminology of strong versus weak efficiency was first introduced by Brown and Ashenfelter
(1986).
2Our results also suggest that a common fear in studies of collective
bargaining in the public sector, namely the risk that the employer does not have
a fixed threat point, is justified.  Collective agreements in school districts where
there is referendum voting on the school budget and where there is the threat of
a state-imposed “austerity budget” in the case of disagreement are significantly
different from settlements in school districts with no such constraints on
spending. In particular, these school boards where the budgets are subject to
referendum voting have significantly smaller employment levels than
unconstrained boards, whereas the wage settlements, while smaller, are not
significantly so.
Lastly, the literature on the economics of education is often concerned
with the impact of teacher salaries and staffing levels on the provision of
educational services to a community, usually measured as some function of
expenditures per pupil.  These variables are most frequently taken as
exogenous, and the bargaining environment is never explicitly considered in
their measurement or instrumentation.  We find that the failure to explicitly
account for the fact that wages and employment are negotiated in New York
State public schools leads to incorrect estimates of the effects of certain
community specific characteristics (such as the full value of property and the
percentage of minority students) on the level of educational services a
community receives and of the influence of certain aspects of the bargaining
environment on negotiated contracts.
This paper is structured as follows.  Section II presents the questions
we address here in more detail and provides empirical and theoretical
justifications for the modeling strategy we employ.  We then lay out our
structural equations and the solution to the system in section III.  We
specifically choose an objective function for the union that allows for risk
aversion and an objective function for the employer (the local school board)
that allows it to trade off educational services against taxes and does not impose
constant returns to scale a priori.  Section IV discusses the empirical
implications of our functional forms, both in terms of what they imply about the
behavior of both parties and what they suggest for the resource allocation
generated by a Nash cooperative bargain. Section V details the econometric
specification of the model, including the approximating functions used for the
bargaining power parameters3  and the community preferences.  Various
specifications of the model are estimated as a system of nonlinear simultaneous
equations.  After describing the construction of the data set used in the
estimations in section VI, we present our empirical results in section VII.
Section VIII discusses the implications of controlling for negotiated wages
when considering the provision of educational services to a community. Section
IX concludes.
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 Svejnar (1986) uses a similar approximating function approach in his estimation of bargaining power.
3II.a.  Collective Bargaining and Public Schools
According to recent estimates, 36.86 percent of public sector workers
in the United States are members of a union, and 43.33 percent of U.S. public
sector employees are covered by a collective bargaining agreement.4  Despite
this fact, most studies of markets for public goods fail to explicitly account for
the fact that both public sector wages and employment are often the outcome of
a bargaining process between government and labor.  When one considers that
there is no universally accepted model of how unions and governments engage
in bargaining, this situation seems less puzzling.  Not only is there a lack of
consensus on how to model bargaining power in general, but among the
competing theories that depend on some measure of union “bargaining power”,
few attempts have been made to estimate this measure in the case of public
sector collective bargaining.
One important instance in which collective bargaining is likely to play
a major role is the market for publicly provided educational services.  Not
accounting for the fact that wages and employment are often the outcome of
bargaining between a teachers’ union and a school district can lead researchers
to overstate the level of educational services flowing to a community.  For
instance, in most analyses of a community’s demand for education, authors use
total expenditures per pupil as the measure of educational services provided to
the community.5  If the labor market for teacher services were perfectly
competitive, all teachers would be paid their marginal products and this would
be an appropriate measure.  However, in many locations teachers are unionized,
and an enormous literature has developed6  that shows the (generally
significant and positive) impact that collective bargaining has on the wages of
covered workers.  Since teacher compensation takes up the largest share of
educational spending, the level of expenditure per pupil is likely to severely
overestimate the educational services consumed by a community in unionized
school boards.
In order to arrive at a correct measure of educational services
consumed in a school district, it is essential to model teacher employment and
wage determination.  The literature on the modeling of collective bargaining
has several suggestions for how to model the results of a collective bargain
                                                       
4 
 Hirsch and Macpherson (1993).  Their estimates are calculated using the 1991 Current Population
Survey.
5 
 See, for example, Bergstrom et al (1988), Megdal (1984), Bergstrom et al (1982), Conte (1985).
6 
 See Lewis (1986) for a survey of several hundred studies of the union-nonunion wage differential
published prior to 1984.
4between an employer and a union, but there are several problems particular to
public sector collective bargaining that do not arise in models that deal with the
private sector. First of all, many of these models rely on the presence of a threat
point for both the employer and the union in the determination of the
equilibrium contract.  Unfortunately, in the public sector it is not clear that
such a firm threat point exists for the employer.  For example, school boards
can negotiate contracts with their unions and then fix a millage (property tax)
rate according to the negotiated wage bill.  This implies the absence of a true
“zero profit condition”, since (in theory) the school board can set whatever
millage rate it finds necessary to cover its costs.  There is little direct incentive
to “bargain tough” with the unions, and thus wages might be higher than they
would otherwise be if there was not this flexible ceiling.  Thus if one were to
estimate union power based on the wage gains achieved for union members,
one might (incorrectly) draw the conclusion that unions in the public sector
were stronger than their private sector equivalents just because their bargaining
counterparts have less rigid constraints than in the private sector.
There are several factors that might mitigate this argument.  First, a
standard Tiebout argument would suggest that an excessive tax burden could
lead to out-migration and thus a drop in property values and therefore a drop in
the tax base.  This would, over time, limit the flexibility of the school board to
further increase taxes.  Second, reelection concerns could cause public sector
employers to be wary of raising taxes too brutally, since certain populations
might be more sensitive to the tax burden imposed by the school board than to
the educational services it provides.  Finally, certain institutional factors can
serve as constraints on the school board’s ability to raise taxes or on the union’s
ability to force its demands. For instance, in some cases the school board’s
budget must be subjected to a referendum vote, and too many rejections can
lead to an “austerity budget” being imposed from the state level.  This sort of
constraint could serve to harden the school board’s threat point in collective
bargaining.  It is also the case that, in most states, it is illegal for public sector
unions to strike. In New York State, if a teachers’ union strikes it can lose the
right to collect dues directly from teachers’ paychecks, and union members may
be fined two days pay for each day on strike.7 
There have been some attempts to empirically apprehend the question
of collective bargaining in the public sector8 .  In particular, Currie (1991) and
Eberts and Stone (1986) both develop models of bargaining applied to the
market for public school teachers.  These papers focus on determining if there
is empirical evidence of school districts and teachers’ unions engaging in
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 See the Taylor Act.
8 
 Some of the earlier reduced-form tests of competing bargaining models include Brown and
Ashenfelter (1986) and MaCurdy and Pencavel(1986).  See Pencavel (1990) for a recent review of this
literature. See Freeman and Ichniowski (1988) for a set of studies on public sector unions.
5efficient contracting; that is, they attempt to determine if the negotiated wage-
employment combination lies off of the school districts' labor demand curves
and on the contract curve in wage-employment space.9   Using reduced form
specifications, Eberts and Stone find evidence of efficient contracting, while
Currie cannot reject the null hypothesis of strongly efficient contracting.
Neither of these papers actually attempts to estimate the ability of the
union to appropriate rents for the teachers they represent. Perhaps the best
known attempt to estimate union bargaining power (albeit on a small sample of
private sector bargaining pairs) comes from Svejnar (1986).  He imposes an
efficient contract specification and attempts to estimate whether the contract
curve and the labor demand curve coincide.  In the process, he also uses
approximating functions to recover an estimate of the union’s bargaining power
over employment and wages10 .  In his empirical results, he is unable to reject
the hypothesis of a 50-50 split of quasi-rents between the employer and the
union, although his point estimates vary wildly and are not constrained to fall
between 0 and 1.
II.b. The Two-Stage Approach to Modeling Collective Bargaining
In this paper, we make use of the formalization of collective
bargaining proposed by Manning (1987).  His is a sequential bargaining model
in which the union and employer bargain separately over wages and
employment.  He considers both the case where the employer and union bargain
over employment first and wages second, as well as the opposite case where
wages are bargained over first and employment second.  He shows that if the
bargaining over employment takes place first, the resulting level of employment
will always be such that the contract is socially efficient, i.e.  the marginal
product of labor will be equal to the outside wage at the negotiated employment
level.  However, when the union and employer bargain over wages first and
then over employment, one can observe wage-employment combinations that
correspond to monopoly union, right to manage, efficient contracting, or what
he calls “inefficient contracting” models, depending upon the bargaining power
parameters of the model, which are allowed to differ between the wage and the
employment bargain11 .  Inefficient contracting, in the sense suggested by
Manning, results from a case in which the union has different bargaining
                                                       
9 
 See Farber (1986) for a more complete description of these types of  bargaining models.
10 
 Svejnar (1986) models bargaining power as a linear function of the unemployment rate, the rate of
change in inflation, and several indicator variables corresponding to the presence of government-
imposed price and wage guidelines and regulations.
11 
 Differential bargaining power in a sequential bargain can be shown to be isomorphic with
differential union preferences over wages and employment (see Pencavel (1990)).  Appendix 1 derives
the transformation.  However, we believe that once one allows for risk aversion on behalf of the union,
the most reasonable interpretation of the model parameters is in terms of differential bargaining power.
6powers over both wages and employment, and the resulting contract lies neither
on the contract curve nor on the labor demand curve.  What makes Manning's
paper econometrically useful is that it is based on a structural model that is
relatively straightforward to implement empirically, and testing between
competing bargaining models reduces to performing statistical tests on
estimated parameters.
Although the added flexibility of the Manning model is in itself a
desirable property, one might ask whether it is reasonable to assume that wage
and employment bargains are distinct, and whether union bargaining power
over wages and employment could be different. As a means of justifying his
approach,  Manning (1987) cites the fact that wage contracts are typically
negotiated for fixed durations (usually 1 or 2 years in Britain, 3 years in the
United States).  On the other hand, the firms that sign these agreements
typically see their employment fluctuate throughout the duration of the
contract, and not just at renegotiation times.  This alone suggests a lack of
simultaneity in wage and employment determination.  Manning further
suggests that the impossibility of complete contingent contracting might make
it optimal to fix a wage ex-ante and vary employment as a result of market
conditions ex-post.  This is particularly likely to be relevant in the case of
public education, since students are discrete.  Finally, Manning cites other
research that suggests that bargaining over wages is separated from bargaining
over employment in a hierarchical sense, with wage negotiations taking place
at the enterprise level and employment negotiations taking place at the
establishment, or even workplace, level.  Insofar as the temporal decoupling of
wage and employment negotiations is concerned, we feel that the Manning
approach is reasonable.  For all of these reasons, we feel justified in taking a
sequential approach to modeling collective bargaining.
Insofar as the possibility of differential bargaining power is concerned,
we feel that this too is a reasonable allowance to make.  The distinction
between the enterprise level wage bargain and the establishment (or workplace)
level employment bargain noted by Manning suggests that better organized
workplaces might be able to affect employment decisions more effectively than
less well organized workplaces. The presence of last-in, first-out rules found in
many union contracts may also make it easier for the union to mobilize support
for wage demands (that affect all workers) rather than employment concerns
that only affect some workers12 .  In addition, it may be the case that the
institutional structure of bargaining may have an effect on the different types of
bargaining power.  For instance, teachers' contracts in New York State have
historically included detailed wage scales, with the level of wages
corresponding to the number of years of teaching experience and the highest
degree attained by the teacher, while they only specify a range of possible class
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 See Manning (1987) p.  125.
7sizes, such as 20 to 25 students per class.  This type of contract suggests that
teachers’ unions may have more power to fix particular wage rates than to set
employment levels. Furthermore, when reading the headlines about the causes
of various strikes, one sometimes hears that the last sticking point between
management and labor is some aspect of working conditions or staffing rules,
after wages have been settled upon. An equal bargaining power assumption
would suggest that disagreements are either only over wages (in a strongly
efficient framework) or over both wages and working conditions/staffing rules
(in a weakly efficient framework).  One would need a horizontal contract curve
in order to observe a disagreement over just working conditions/staffing rules,
and the only efficient contract that could generate such a contract curve would
require to union to be infinitely risk averse13 .
III.  Specification of the Structural Model
We begin by assuming, as is common in the literature, that the
negotiations between the school district and the teachers’ union over the level
of wages and the level of employment in the school district are independent of
other issues that might be discussed in contract talks, such as teaching
materials or support staff14 .  The school district's objective function is
supposed to be of the form15 
γ λαL w L− (1)
In equation (1), γ αL  is the school district's educational
production function, which takes on a Cobb-Douglas form with a being returns
to scale, g being a constant and L being the level of employment in the district.
λ w L  is a standard cost constraint, where w is the wage rate that the
school district must pay its teachers and l is a parameter that reflects the school
district’s aversion to taxes.  In this formulation, it is assumed that g and l are
                                                       
13 
 See Svejnar (1986).  It should be noted that most models of strike behavior are concerned
exclusively with the wage level, and take the employment level as given (see, for example, Ashenfelter
and Johnson (1969), Kennan (1986), Cramton and Tracy (1992)).  Our extrapolation here relates to a
simple efficient contracting model with imperfect information where the employer’s threat point is
unknown.  Thus the union only proposes wage-employment combinations on the contract curve, and the
slope of the contract curve will determine the sources of disagreement.
14 
 We interpret bargaining over class size as bargaining over employment (conditional on enrollment).
Implicitly, this forces us to assume that a school board cannot substitute teachers’ aids for regular
teachers.   However, because in general, teachers’ aids must be supervised, this assumption  seems
reasonable.
15 
 The objective functions for the school board and the teachers’ union have been selected to be as
flexible as possible while remaining analytically tractable.  Although these specifications are almost
surely too simple to capture the complexity of the true objectives of the school board and the teachers’
union, they generate estimable structural equations from which much intuition can be drawn.
8both functions of community-specific characteristics, such as wealth and
enrollment16 , while it is assumed that a is invariant across school districts.
Note that, although g and l will not be separately identifiable, the size of l
relative to g will reflect a community’s preferences for taxes relative to
educational services.  Also note that we are not constraining the school district
to have constant returns to scale in the production of educational services.  A
value of a such that 0<a<1 would imply decreasing returns to scale in the
production of educational services.  Note that this is a necessary condition for
the existence of an interior solution to the school board’s private maximization
problem. a =1 would imply constant returns to scale, and a >1 corresponds to
increasing returns.  Although we do not have an a priori for the size of the
returns to scale parameter in the production of educational services, we would
still anticipate 0<a<1.
Note that the objective function specified in (1) gets around the debate
of how to measure demand for publicly provided education, namely choice
between a median voter model and that of Romer and Rosenthal (1979).
Regardless of the means by which demand is modeled, we hope to capture
community preferences towards educational services relative to taxes via the
relation between g and l.  Although somewhat abstract, this approach allows us
to have well defined community preferences that will affect the behavior of the
school district during bargaining.
The teachers’ union’s objective function is derived from a union
maximizing the expected utility of a member with a utility function of the form
( )U w w= τ 17 .  This generates a union objective function of the form
( )L w xτ τ− , (2)
where x is the opportunity wage of a union member (teacher).  This functional
form allows for risk averse (t < 1) or risk loving (t > 1) preferences on behalf of
the union members to be reflected in the objective function of the union
negotiators.
The bargaining takes place sequentially in a manner suggested by
Manning (1987).  In the first stage, the school district and the teachers’ union
                                                       
16 
 The inclusion of enrollment in the γ and λ terms allows one to interpret this specification in terms of
student-teacher ratios.  If total enrollment were to have no impact on community preferences for
education or taxes, but the appropriate production function was written in terms of the number of
teachers per student (the inverse of the student-teacher ratio), then enrollment would appear in the γ term
as enrollment-α.  In the empirical work we take a linear approximation to the ratio γ λ , since it is
possible that enrollment will enter the school district’s objective by some means other than just class
sizes.
17 
 See MacDonald and Solow (1982) for details on this approach to deriving union objective functions.
9bargain over wages.  In the second stage, the two parties bargain over the
quantity of labor services that will be provided to the school district18 .  The
equilibrium is derived by solving the model by backward induction, beginning
with solving for the (second stage) equilibrium employment level conditional
on the (first stage) negotiated wage.  We then derive the equilibrium wage
bargain, given that both parties know how this wage will affect the subsequent
employment bargain19 .
Let q be a parameter that describes the relative bargaining power of
the union over employment, with 0 1≤ ≤q .  The equilibrium employment
level (L) conditional on the negotiated wage (w) is found by solving the Nash
cooperative bargaining game over employment, which is equivalent to solving
(3) below.
( )( ) ( )max
L
q q
L w x L wLτ τ αγ λ− − −1 (3)
After considerable simplification, one can show that the level of L that satisfies
the first order condition for an optimum for (3) can be described as in (4)
below.
( )( )
L
q
w
=
+ −



−γ α α
λ
α1
1
1
(4)
Given equation (4), it is possible to close the model.  This is done by solving
the Nash cooperative bargaining game over wages (w) given that the players
know how the second stage of the bargaining (over L, as described above) will
proceed.  This is equivalent to solving (5) below, where the equilibrium
function L(w) found in (4) is substituted in for L in equation (5).  Let p describe
the bargaining power of the union over wages, where 0 1≤ ≤p .  Recall that p
is not necessarily equal to q.
( )( ) ( )max
w
p p
L w x L wL− −
−γ λα 1 (5)
Although upon initial inspection it might appear that equation (5) -
with equation (4) substituted in - would be intractable.  However, the first-order
condition of (5) with respect to w is actually quite simple, and equation (6)
below provides the analytic expression for w.
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 Manning (1987) shows that if the union and school district bargain over employment first and wages
second, then the parties will engage in efficient contracting.  Since we want to allow for the possibility
that the negotiated contract might not be efficient, and since real world evidence points in that direction,
we solve the model as if the parties bargain first over wages and then over employment.
19 
 Our approach, as in Manning (1987), is to treat the bargaining as a one-shot game with zero time
discounting between the negotiations over wages and over employment.  There are no other explicit
dynamics in the model.
10
( )
( )( )w x
p
p
=
+ −
+ − −




α α
α α τ
τ1
1 1
1
(6)
Not surprisingly, the equilibrium wage is an increasing function of x and an
increasing function of p given that the teachers are risk averse or risk neutral
and 0 1< <α .
Given equation (6) it is possible to solve for the unconditional
equilibrium level of employment for the school district by substituting the
expression in (6) into equation (4).  This expression appears below in (7).  As
in the case of wages, the equilibrium level of employment is found to be an
increasing function of q for risk averse or risk neutral workers and 0 1< <α .
In addition, the model predicts that the equilibrium level of employment will be
a decreasing function of the union's bargaining power over wages.
( ) ( )
( )( )L
a q
x
p
p
=




+ − + −
+ − −










−
−
γ
λ
α α α
α α τ
τ α1 1
1 1
1
1
1
(7)
IV.  Implications of the Structural Model
As Manning notes,20  this framework can represent contracts that
correspond to different types of collective bargaining models, depending on the
values of the (estimated) parameters p and q.  For example, p q=  implies that
the school district and teachers’ union engage in efficient contracting, i.e. that
the negotiated agreement is on the contract curve given by the school district’s
and teachers’ union’s preferences.  If q = 0  and p > 0  then the right to
manage model will be observed, i.e. the union and employer bargain over
wages and then the school district picks a level of employment on the labor
demand curve.  If q = 0  and p = 1 then the monopoly union model holds,
namely the union sets the wage rate and the school board chooses the
employment level, once again on the labor demand curve.  Finally, if p q≠
then we will observe inefficient contracting; in other words the school district
and teachers’ union agree on a wage and employment combination that lies
neither on the labor demand curve nor on the contract curve.  Typically,
employment in this contract will be a function of the negotiated wage (see
equation (4) above). Hypothesis tests on the estimated values of p and q can be
treated as direct tests of the different bargaining models.
                                                       
20 See Manning (1987), pp.  126-129 for details.
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One can see how the parameter restrictions implied by the various
models are translated into wage-employment combinations by examining
equations (4), (6) and (7).  For example, the two labor demand models
(monopoly union and right to manage) impose a zero bargaining power over
employment ( q = 0 ) on the union.  In this case, equation (4) reduces to
L
w
=




−γα
λ
α
1
1
(8)
which is precisely the labor demand curve corresponding to the objective
function (1).  Similarly, if one continues on to the monopoly union case
( p = 1), equation (6) gives
( )w x= − −




1
1 1
1
τ α
τ
which is the wage rate that would be chosen by solving the monopoly union’s
problem given the employer’s labor demand curve (8).
In efficient contracting models, the wage-employment combination is
on the contract curve.  With the objective functions in equations (1) and (2), the
contract curve can be written as
( )L w x
w
=



 − −












−λ
γατ
τ
τ α
1
1
1
This contract curve is decreasing for t>1, vertical for t=1 and increasing for t
less than, but sufficiently close to, 1.
The parameter restrictions imposed by efficient contracting ( p q= )
translate into wage-employment combinations in the same manner as the labor
demand models do.  In the case of strongly efficient contracting, the union
behaves as if it maximizes the net gain of its employed members.  This
translates into a union objective function of the form
( )L w x−
which is the same as if the union’s members were risk neutral (τ = 1 ).  By
equation (7), this implies that the equilibrium level of employment will be
L
a
x
=




−γ
λ
α
1
1
(9)
and the negotiated wage will be
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w x p= + −

1
1 α
α
. (10)
The employment level in (9) is that which maximizes quasi rents, while the
negotiated wage in (10) is the wage that guarantees the union its outside wage
plus a share p of the quasi rents per worker (quasi rents per worker are
x
1 −



α
α
 when l is renormalized to 1).
In the weakly efficient contracting case, the contract curve is not
vertical.  Our functional forms are sufficiently flexible to handle both upward
sloping (t < 1) and downward sloping (t>1) contract curves.  In previous
empirical tests21 , a failure to reject the irrelevance of both the inside wage and
the outside wage in the employment determination equation was most often
interpreted as support for weakly efficient contracts.  This was because the test
was based on a linear approximation to a general functional form, and
significant coefficients on both inside and outside wage terms could be
interpreted as rejection of either labor demand or strongly efficient contracts.
The authors did not consider the possibility of a wage employment combination
that was off of both the labor demand and contract curves.  In the context of our
model, weak efficiency (via equation (7)) implies
( )( )L
x
p=





 + −






−
−γα
λ
α α
τ τ
τ
α1
1
1
1
1 . (11)
and thus the employment level will be a function of both the outside wage and
the union’s bargaining power.  Furthermore, since we do not put constraints on
a and t a priori, the predicted relations between employment and outside wages
and between employment and bargaining power are relatively free to vary
more-or-less independently of each other22 .  However, the additional structure
allows us to estimate the p and q terms directly, and thus while we can
accommodate a broad range of possible contract curves, we can also test
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 See, for example, Brown and Ashenfelter (1986), MaCurdy and Pencavel (1986) or Currie (1991).
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 Specifically, given equation (11), ( )
∂
∂ α
L
x
L
x
= −
−1
 and 
( )
( )( )
∂
∂
τ
α α τ
L
p
L
p
=
−
+ −
1
1
.
Thus even though both derivatives are functions of α, the derivative with respect to p has an extra
degree of freedom due to the presence of τ.
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directly to see if the resource allocation specified in the collective bargaining
agreement is on the contract curve23 .
Since the estimation of (6) and (7) is relatively straightforward, it is
possible to obtain direct estimates of the bargaining power of the teachers’
union over wages and employment, p and q respectively, and thereby direct
tests of the various models of collective bargaining.  Of course, one should
approach our results forewarned; we are estimating a structural model, and
although we have tried to incorporate a maximum level of flexibility in our
functional forms (while keeping the system of equations identified), the
rejection of any particular experiment may be due to model misspecification as
opposed to inappropriateness of the bargaining model.
V.  The Econometric Specification of the Model
Although we could have estimated the system of equations (6) and (7)
directly, we decided to estimate them in log form, in order to reduce the
nonlinearity of the problem at least marginally.  After some simple algebraic
manipulation and taking logarithms of both sides of (6) and (7), we arrive at
our basic estimating equations, (12) and (13) below.
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )( )log log log logw x p p p= + + − − + − −1 1 1 1
τ
α α α τ (12)
( )
( )( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )( )
log 1
1
log log 1
log log log
L
q
x p p p
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
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+ + − − + − −
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










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α
τ
α α α τ
1 1
1 1 1 1
(13)
Here we are presented with two problems.  First, since neither p, q nor
γ
λ  is directly observable, we need to specify approximating functions to allow
us to estimate their values as functions of observable characteristics of the
bargaining situation.  Secondly, since p and q are bargaining power parameters,
whatever functional form we apply must generate predicted p’s and q’s that lie
between 0 and 1. Clearly, there are many functional forms one could apply to
the observable characteristics of the bargaining situation that would ensure that
this condition is met.  In our estimations we used the logistic approximating
functions described in (14) and (15) below to impose these constraints.
                                                       
23 
 Although the system may seem underidentified, the restrictions imposed by equation (6), when
estimated as a system of equations, allow us to separately identify the contract curve and the bargaining
power parameters.
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Note that these specifications allow for bargaining power over wages
and employment to vary across school boards in accordance with the observable
characteristics z1 and z2.  It would also be interesting to allow for unmeasured
school district specific heterogeneity somewhere in the system of equations.
Unfortunately, the nonlinearity of the functional forms renders most projection-
based approaches to controlling for school district specific effects inconsistent.
In addition, we are unable to include a set of school district specific indicator
variables to account for school district specific fixed effects because the short
duration of the panel used (at most 3 years per school district), the construction
of certain variables (county specific variables for counties with only one school
district) and the nonlinearity of the functional forms make such a specification
unidentifiable.  Finally, estimating the model using a random effects approach
(additive on γ λ ) is unfeasible.  One logical approach would seem to include a
random effect multiplicative on γ λ  and distributed log normal24 , with
distribution ( ) ( )log ~ ,ξ αi N 0 1 − , to control for unobserved
heterogeneity.  In multiplying this through it would seem that we would be
simply adding a standard normal disturbance.  However, in this case the
variance of the random effect is a parameter to be estimated, and it is not clear
how to operationalize such a restriction, nor is it clear that such a model would
necessarily converge were we able to correctly implement an estimation
algorithm.  Thus the only manner in which we exploit the panel nature of our
data is through the inclusion of nonparametric time effects.
From a reading of the bargaining literature, it is not clear what one
should include in the vectors of covariates z1 and z2 found in the
approximating functions. For example, as noted above, Svejnar (1986) uses a
linear function of the unemployment rate, the rate of change in inflation and
several indicator variables corresponding to the presence of government-
                                                       
24 
 Note that the nonlinearity of p and q makes many sorts of random effects specifications, where the
random effect enters in the expression for p or q, unjustifiable from anything but a technical point of
view.  For example, we might suppose random effects of the form pi pi i=
~ θ , where θ  has a
distribution with support between 0 and 1 and sufficient probability close to 1 such that ( )( )E log θ
exists.  Aside from the obvious difficulty that this is not a mean-zero random effect, it highly unlikely
that the heterogeneity in the population of bargaining power parameters would be well described by
such a distribution.
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imposed price and wage guidelines and regulations as the determinants of
union power.  In this paper, union power will be specified as a function of the
unemployment rate in the county in which the school district is located, the
percentage of workers covered by a collective bargaining agreement in the
SMSA in which the school district located25 , a measure of the proportion of
individuals in the county that voted for a republican in the last election26 ,
whether or not the school district is a “city” school district (as defined below),
and year dummies.  The expected signs on most of these variables are clear.
Counties with higher unemployment rates should have unions with lower
power, higher union coverage locally may signify greater support for union
demands, and counties that are more “republican” may be more concerned with
tax considerations and promote regulatory environments that are less
sympathetic to unions27 .
A city school district in New York State is different than most other
school districts in a potentially important way.  The millage (school district-
imposed property tax) rate that prevails in city school districts is set by an
elected school board, while in non-city school districts the proposed millage
rate must be voted on in an annual referendum.  A non-city school district can
always send a budget that is too generous to the voters to be rejected.  A city
school district does not have this option.  If the referendum is rejected too often,
the state imposes an “austerity budget” on the school district.  This provides the
school board with the equivalent of a credible threat point28 . Thus it seems
plausible that, all else equal, school districts that have annual referendum
voting should have estimates of union bargaining power that would appear to
be lower than those of teachers’ unions in cities.  In fact, this institutional
characteristic of bargaining in New York State schools will allow us to address
the commonly voiced criticism (described in section II.a.) of bargaining models
as applied to the public sector.
                                                       
25 
 For school districts not in an SMSA, the state-wide non-SMSA average level of coverage is used.
See Hirsch and Macpherson (1993) for details on how these measures were calculated.
26 
 Specifically, we considered elections for public office at the state or national level in which there
was statewide voting for the same candidate (governor, attorney general, senator, and president), and
calculated the difference between the proportion of the vote that was Republican in the state overall and
the proportion of the vote that was Republican in the county in question for a particular election.  This
measure is used to account for candidate- and election-specific effects in voting patterns.
27 
 Historically, in the United States, labor unions have tended to support the Democratic Party over the
Republican Party in most elections, and likewise Democratic administrations tend to be more
sympathetic to labor concerns than Republican ones (Freeman and Medoff (1984)).  Thus we interpret a
relatively large share of Republican votes as being related to policies that favor employers relative to
unions.
28 
 Strictly speaking, if a school district is forced to use an austerity budget, it must meet the terms of a
previously negotiated teacher contract.  However, by cutting the “non-essential” elements of the budget,
such as athletics, extra-curricular activities and support staff, by not providing cost-of-living increases
and (to some extent) by enlarging class sizes, the school district can affect the wages and working
conditions of teachers.
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Finally, since there does not appear to be any consistent way to a priori
distinguish factors that are likely to affect bargaining power over wages from
factors that are likely to affect bargaining power over employment29 , the
vector of explanatory variables that will be used to identify p and q will be the
same, i.e.  z z1 2= .30 
As can be seen from equation (13) above, it is impossible to identify
both g and l separately without imposing arbitrary restrictions.  However,
characteristics related to a community's preferences for education and taxes
should be likely to determine both g and l.  Thus, g and l will be modeled with
the approximating function
log 'γ
λ
β

 = c (16)
In (16), c is a vector of community characteristics likely to affect the demand
for education and distaste for taxes and year dummies and b is a coefficient
vector.  As suggested in the literature on the demand for education, a
community’s demand for education is likely to be a function of the number of
students in the district and expected growth in enrollment, its wealth (as
proxied by the full value of property in the district), teacher quality (as proxied
by the opportunity wage that the school district’s teachers can expect on the job
market) and characteristics that describe the socio-economic composition of the
community, e.g. percentage of minority students, percentage of students on
welfare, etc.  Some of these factors (percentage of students on welfare and
school district wealth in particular) might also be related to preferences
concerning taxes, as would other community-specific characteristics, such as
the strength of the republican vote and variable that might be subsumed into an
SMSA-specific effect.
VI.  Data
The data used in this study come from three different academic years,
1983-84, 1986-7, and 1989-90 and six different data sets.  We restrict our
attention to all school boards for which we could locate a collective bargaining
                                                       
29 
 In New York State, school boards can not finance their budgets with debt.  Even if this were the
case, we could assume that the manner in which public education is financed, e.g.  via increases in the
millage rate or debt issues, does not directly affect the bargaining power of the parties, although it might
enter into the community preferences via an SMSA-specific effect.
30 We exploit the structure of equations (12) and (13) in order to identify all of the relevant parameters
of both δ vectors.
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agreement in the five-year period preceding 1983, which left us with 597
school districts.  Since almost all New York State teachers’ union contracts are
negotiated every two or three years, we chose to examine wages and
employment at three year intervals in order to ensure that each wage-
employment pair we observe corresponds to a different collective bargaining
agreement.  Thus the final sample consisted of 1491 school district-years.31 
The school district wage used in this analysis is defined to be the
average annual earnings from teaching in a school district, according to the
collective agreement, divided by 40.32  The average annual earnings are
divided by 40 in order to account for the fact that a typical New York State
teacher is required to work 200 days a year, and thus this gives a measure of
weekly contractual earnings.  Thus the opportunity wage, x, and the negotiated
wage, w, calculated in this manner are comparable in terms of time scale33 .
The contractual wage information, in addition to the average age, mean
educational attainment and proportion of the teaching staff that is female in a
school district come from the New York State Department of Education’s
Personnel Master File.  The Personnel Master File has a great deal of
information from the personnel records of all New York State public school
teachers starting in 1977 and continuing to the present.
The information about the non-financial characteristics of a school
district comes from the New York State Department of Education’s Basic
Educational data set.  The variables drawn from this data set include:
enrollment in the school district, a measure of the expected change in
enrollment34 , percentage of minority students in the school district and
percentage of children on welfare in the school district.  The information about
the wealth of a school district (the full value of property per pupil) and the
information about whether or not the school district is a city school district
                                                       
31 We use an unbalanced panel of school districts and suppose that the process that determines missing
data years for a given school district is independent of the wage and employment determination
processes.
32 Since the composition of the teaching staff may be a choice variable of the school district, taking the
average annual wage of teachers in a school district as our negotiated wage leaves us open to the
possibility that the composition of teaching staff might be strategically manipulated by the school board.
However, since our alternative wage measure also accounts for the composition of the workforce, the
problem becomes less serious.  Furthermore, since we only model negotiations over a single "wage",
since the employment level times this wage is interpreted as the total wage bill, and since we do not
impose constant returns to scale a priori, the correct measure for the "wage" is an average compensation
cost measure, averaged over total teacher employment.
33 
 Opportunity wages were also calculated on a weekly basis.
34 Future change in enrollment in year t is defined to be:
( )
( )
Enrollment t Enrollment t
Enrollment t
+ −3
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comes from the New York State school district financial files.  The county
unemployment rate and proportion of the Republican vote in a county comes
from the New York State Statistical Year Book.  Finally, the union coverage
data was kindly provided by Barry Hirsch and corresponds to the data presented
in Hirsch and Macpherson (1993).  Their calculations are based on information
found in the Current Population Survey.
The opportunity wage (x) is calculated using a two-step process35 .  In
the first stage an earnings equation is estimated using data from a cross-section
of working adults found in the NBERs outgoing rotation group subsample of
the Current Population Survey.  The log of usual weekly earnings is estimated
to be a function of sex, age, age squared, educational attainment,36  whether or
not the individual lives in an SMSA, and a set of year indicators.37   In the
second stage, the log of the opportunity wage is imputed by taking the average
levels of the explanatory variables for teachers in each school district and
multiplying them by the estimated coefficients from the first-stage.
Descriptive statistics for all of the variables used in the estimation of
the bargaining and the educational services models appear in Table 1.
VII.  Results
We estimated the structural models in equations (12) and (13)
according to several methods.  In all cases we added normally-distributed i.i.d.
additive errors to equations (12) and (13), allowing for cross-equation
covariance in the additive errors.  We estimate the system of equations by
nonlinear least squares under several maintained hypotheses.  In addition to the
unconstrained specification described in section V, we estimated the system
imposing q=0 (the maintained hypothesis corresponding to labor demand
models) and imposing δ δ1 2= , thereby imposing p=q (the maintained
hypothesis corresponding to efficient contracting models).  For each of these
                                                       
35 
 In addition to our derived opportunity wage, we also used the average wage in the county in which
the school district was located and the average wage in all other school districts in the county as
alternative measures of the opportunity wage.  In the vast majority of cases, structural models using the
county-average ex-district teacher wage did not converge, while those using the average county wage
yielded results very similar to those presented below.
36 
 Educational attainment is measured as a set of indicator variables corresponding to varying degrees
of attainment; that is primary school, more than primary school but less than high school, high school,
more than high school but less than 4-year college, 4-year college, more than 4-year college but less
than masters, and masters and beyond.
37 
 The results of this earnings equation are presented in appendix B.  These models were estimated
with and without corrections for self-selection.  The results presented below use the selection bias-
corrected alternative wages.
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maintained hypotheses, we also constrained the union members to be risk
neutral (t=1).  Thus, if p is estimated to be equal to q (in either the
unconstrained or the p=q case), this implies that the efficient contract will be
strongly efficient.
To give a point of reference, we first present a series of estimates of a
linear approximation model for employment determination.  These models
include the inside wage, the outside wage38  and all of the regressors appearing
in the z1 , z2  and c vectors and three different measures of the outside wage by
OLS.  We also estimate the linear model instrumenting for the inside wage. We
then present our estimates of the system of equations (12) and (13) with the
various parameter restrictions.  We show what these estimates imply for the
average levels of bargaining power over wages and employment, and construct
several tests of the hypotheses suggested by the labor demand and efficient
contracting models.  We then discuss briefly the interpretation of the estimated
parameters of the 
γ
λ
 function.
VII.A.  Linear Approximation Results
For the sake of comparison with existing approaches to modeling
public sector bargaining and with our estimates of the structural models, we
estimated a series of linear employment determination models.  These results
can be interpreted as first-order approximations to a general employment
determination model and are presented in table 2.  The first 3 specifications
represent ordinary least squares estimates of the relation between negotiated
wages, outside wages and employment.  They differ only in their definition of
outside wages: computed based on the human capital model described at the
end of section IV (OLS1), measured as the average wage in the county (OLS2)
or measured, as suggested by Currie (1991) as the average wage in other school
districts in the same county (OLS3).  In the fourth specification (IV) we
instrumented the current negotiated wage with the previous negotiated wage
and a year effect indicator.  Although this approach required us to eliminate all
school districts with only one observation for lack of a previously negotiated
wage, as well as the first observation from every school district with more than
one observation (for the same reasons), it is consistent with the idea
(presupposed in the efficient contracting model) that employment and earnings
are simultaneously determined.
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 For comparison purposes, we estimate the OLS specification with three different measures of the
outside wage:  our human capital regression predicted wage, the average wage in the county in which
the school district is located, and the average wage in all other school districts in the county (the measure
used by Currie (1991)).
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A naive interpretation of the results of such models is the following.  If
labor demand models are appropriate, the outside wage should be insignificant
in the employment determination decision, since all of the relevant information
is already contained in the inside wage.  Furthermore, the labor demand model
implies that, under normal circumstances, the relation between inside wages
and employment should be negative.  On the other hand, the strongly efficient
contracting model as defined by Brown and Ashenfelter (1986) suggests that
employment is fixed based on the outside wage alone, and thus the inside wage
should be insignificant in these regressions.  It also suggests that, under
standard assumptions, the relation between employment and the outside wage
should be negative.  Both of the remaining alternatives (weakly efficient
contracting and Manning’s “inefficient contracting”) are more flexible
characterizations, in that they make no a priori predictions about covariances
between observables.  One distinction is that weakly efficient contracting
supposes that the wage-employment pair is nonetheless on an (unobservable)
contract curve that could theoretically be derived if one knew the correct
objective functions of that bargaining parties.  Inefficient contracting, on the
other hand, implies that the negotiated agreement can be found somewhere off
the contract curve determined by the two parties’ objective functions, but since
this is a measure zero set in wage-employment space for most normal objective
functions, this characterization has little empirically testable content.
Nevertheless, neither the weakly efficient or inefficient contracting approach to
modeling collective bargaining implies testable restrictions on the coefficients
on inside wages or outside wages in a linear employment determination
equation.
The results in table 2 are consistent with neither labor demand nor
strongly efficient contracting models. In all four specifications we find a
significant positive relation between the log of the inside wage and the log of
employment.  This is only possible under some form of collective bargaining
other than labor demand or strong efficiency.  Furthermore, although the
outside wage enters significant and negative (as necessary for strong efficiency)
in OLS specifications 2 and 3, the relation is insignificant when one uses a
human capital approach to measuring outside wages, and the relation is
positive and insignificant once we instrument the inside wage.  These results
suggest that the most appropriate model for collective bargaining in public
schools in New York is either weakly efficient contracting with an upward-
sloping contracting curve or inefficient contracting.  In any case, in our
structural estimates, we should not expect to estimate q=0 (labor demand
models) or p=q and t=1 (strongly efficient contracting models).
Several other coefficients in these regressions are suggestive for what
we should expect in the structural models, and are consistent with our
expectations. For example, city is always positive and significant.  This
suggests that the fear expressed earlier, namely that public sector unions might
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appear stronger than their private sector equivalents, is at least somewhat
justified.  Those school districts in which the budget is subjected to a
referendum vote (the non-city school districts) have significantly lower
employment levels than city school districts.  Note that this effect is present
even when one controls for whether or not the school district is located in an
SMSA.
Interestingly, the republican vote is also consistently positive, although
significant only in the instrumental variables specification.  This suggests that
more republican school districts tend to prefer higher employment levels.  Of
course, given the reduced-form nature of the models being estimated, we cannot
directly draw conclusions about the implications of being in a republican school
district for bargaining power or for community preferences, since the two
effects are confounded in a single coefficient in the linear approximation
approach.  However, this might suggest that there is a positive relation between
the republican vote and union bargaining power over employment that is
sufficiently strong to overwhelm the expected negative relation between the
republican vote and community distaste for taxes.
Finally, the county unemployment rate enters negative and significant
in the OLS models (and significant at the 90 percent level in the IV model).
Union coverage has no significant effect, while larger school districts (as
measured both by enrollment and the number of schools) have more teachers
(as expected) and school districts with more minority students tend to have
fewer teachers.
VII.B.  Estimates from the Structural Models
The nonlinear OLS estimates of the parameters from equations (12)
and (13) appear in Table 3.  Results from three different specifications of the
model are presented.  In the first specification, we forced q to be equal to zero.
This is equivalent to imposing a labor demand model on the data.  If the
estimated p is not significantly different from one, we have the monopoly union
model, otherwise we have the “right to manage” model.  In both of these
models the union has no bargaining power over employment.  In the second
specification we constrained the coefficients on the vectors that determine
bargaining power of wages and employment to be the same ( )δ δ1 2= , which
corresponds to the case where the union’s power over wages and employment
are equal, or the efficient contracting framework.  Finally, in our third
specification we allow all coefficients in the d vectors to vary freely, thus
allowing the union differential bargaining power over wages and employment.
Under this specification, all of the other bargaining models can be reduced to
constraints of the estimated parameters, and these hypotheses can be
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econometrically tested.  Each of these three specifications is estimated both
with and without the constraint t=1, i.e. that the members of the union are risk
neutral (or that any efficient contract will be strongly efficient).  Table 4
presents the mean and standard deviation over the pooled sample of the values
of p and q implied by each of the three specifications.
There are many interesting aspects to the results.  First, as one might
expect, convergence was more rapid when we imposed the t=1 constraint (at
most 7 iterations) than when we allowed t to be free (between 38 and 47
iterations).  Although the results are dramatically different between the
specifications where we constrain q=0 and the specifications with p=q and p
and q free, the imposition of the various constraints does not seem to have a
dramatic impact on the explanatory power of the model.  In particular, even
though the models estimated under the assumption p=q are closer to the
unconstrained models than those estimated under the assumption q=0, the q=0
explain the data marginally better.
In the cases where the point estimate of t is close to 1 (p and q free and
q=0), the imposition of this constraint does not have much impact on the
results.  On the other hand, in the model where this constraint bears some
theoretical weight (p=q), the point estimate is significantly different from 1,
and imposing strongly efficient contracting (i.e. imposing t=1) changes the
results fairly dramatically.  Although the point estimate of t is positive in the p
and q free specification , suggesting an downward-sloping contract curve (see
section IV), a value of t less than, but close to, 1 is certainly within a 95%
confidence interval.  Still, for the efficient contract (p=q) results, t<1 is far
outside a 95% confidence band. Recall that the linear approximation results
suggested that, if an efficient contracting framework was appropriate, it would
be necessary to have a positive relation between the negotiated wage and
employment levels, and thereby and upward-sloping contract curve.  Our
estimates of t provide the first indices that perhaps efficient contracting is not
the appropriate framework for modeling collective bargaining in New York
State public schools.
With respect to the determinants of bargaining power, we find much of
what is expected in the least constrained specification (column 6, p and q free, t
free).  A higher level of unemployment has a significantly negative impact on
the bargaining power of the union, both over wages and employment.  This
could be proxying for general economic conditions in the county, or could be
the result of another commonly cited mechanism, namely the idea that a looser
labor market (more unemployment) means that striking workers can be more
easily replaced, thereby reducing their bargaining power39 .  We also find that
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 Since teacher certification requirements are quite loose in New York State, certification
considerations are not likely to have much impact on the ease of replacement of striking teachers.
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a higher rate of union coverage increases the union’s bargaining power,
although this effect is not significant for bargaining power over wages, and is
only significant at the 10% level for bargaining power over employment.  It
should be noted, however, that whenever coverage is significant in the other
specifications, it has a positive impact on bargaining power.
The coefficient corresponding to whether a school district is a city
school district is positive and statistically significant in the p and q free
specifications for bargaining power over employment.  It has an insignificant
impact on the bargaining power over wages in the unrestricted specifications,
although its impact is significant and positive in the p=q, t=1 specification and
is (surprisingly) negative in the q=0 specifications. These results are consistent
in that, given the downward-sloping labor demand curve suggested by (1) and
the estimated a<1, a negative coefficient implies that a non-city school board
has more bargaining power, and thus gets a higher wage and a lower
employment level.  The unrestricted results imply that non-city school boards
have lower employment levels and (insignificantly) higher wage rates.
This result is consistent with the idea that the institutional constraint
of referendum voting imposes a credible threat point on the school board, at
least insofar as concerns staffing levels.  To further investigate this possibility,
we analyzed the city and non-city schools separately (results not shown).  We
find that whereas most of the expected results hold for the non-city schools
(where the threat point is solid), some unexpected results are found for the city
school sample.  For example, we find a statistically significant negative effect
of contract coverage on bargaining power over wages (-0.026 with standard
error 0.012) and no effect at all for unemployment on the bargaining power (t=-
0.56 in the p approximating equation and t=-1.19 in the q approximating
equation).  This is further evidence that the presence of a firm threat point is an
important prerequisite to applying most contracting models.
We also find that when a school district is located in an area that tends
to vote republican more often than the statewide average, the teachers’ union
has less bargaining power over wages and more bargaining power over
employment.  This result holds, with varying degrees of significance, for all
specifications of structural model we estimated.  Note that the result concerning
bargaining power over employment is consistent with our linear approximation
results.
Finally, we find that union power over wages and employment is
significantly greater in 1986 relative to 1983 in almost all specifications, while
it is significantly greater over employment in the least constrained
specifications in 1989 than in 1983.  The 1989 results concerning bargaining
power over wages are less clear, except that in the q=0 specifications the unions
seem to have been stronger than in 1983. These results seem more-or-less
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consistent with fluctuations in the economy of New York State during this time
period.
VII.C.  Implications for Bargaining Power and Bargaining Models
Our results concerning the point estimate of t in the p=q model and
the fact that certain covariates (such as city/non-city, the proportion of the
republican vote and the 1989 indicator variable) affect bargaining power of
wages and employment in opposite directions in the least constrained models
suggests that the efficient contracting models may not be the most appropriate
for collective bargaining in New York State public schools.  The fact that the
results in the q=0 specification are, in general, significantly different from the
results for bargaining power over wages in the corresponding p and q free
specifications suggests that labor demand models may not be appropriate either.
In this section, we investigate these alternatives more closely using the results
from the two p and q free models.
As a first approach, we test for the equivalence of the elements of δ 1
and δ 2 .  A chi-square test (6 degrees of freedom) gives ( )χ 2 6 28 210= .
when t is free and ( )χ 2 6 38 417= .  when t is constraint to be equal to 1.
This suggests that the fitted values of p and q might not be identical.  As
Manning notes, when p is different from q, unions and school districts are not
engaging in Pareto efficient contracting, since the resulting agreement lies off
of the contract curve.
In order to develop a sense of what the results in table 3 imply about
the levels of union bargaining power over wages and employment, table 4
contains the means and standard deviations of fitted values of p and q, averaged
over the population and evaluated under the different specifications of the
model40 .  Here we see that, on average, imposing the t=1 constraint does not
seem to change the fitted values of p or q very much.  Still, there are differences
in the average values of p and q according to the model estimated, with the p=q
model generating the smallest average fitted values for p and the q=0 model
generating the largest.  It should also be noted that bargaining power over
employment, when estimated separately, is always estimated to be higher than
bargaining power over wages.  In addition, it is interesting to note that the
estimates of bargaining power over wages are all within 2 standard deviations
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 The values of p and q are calculated as specified in equations (14) and (15).  These results are
useful for developing intuition, whereas in the next paragraph we construct actual hypothesis tests of the
various models.
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of 0.541 , and are farther than 2 standard deviations from 0.  This suggests
that, although teachers are not paid their marginal product, there does not
appear to be evidence that unions have complete control over their school
boards.
The mean estimated p under the q=0 specifications strongly suggests
that the hypothesis of a monopoly union model (which implies p = 1) should
be rejected.  This is further reinforced by the unrestricted specifications, where
the mean estimated q is, in both cases, more than 6 standard deviations away
from zero.  This implies that both sorts of labor demand model (monopoly
union and right to manage) are inappropriate in the case of teacher bargaining
in New York State.  On the other hand, in the unrestricted models the
difference between the mean p and q is smaller than the sum of the population
standard deviations, suggesting that they might not, in reality, be significantly
different from each other.  We need, however, to be careful when interpreting
results based on averages over the population, since Manning’s theory about
contract efficiency concerns equivalence of p and q at a bargaining unit level,
and not over the population as a whole.
Note that comparison of the mean fitted values of p and q in the
unrestricted case suggests that although we rejected the very strong hypothesis
that δ δ1 2= , we may not be able to reject the hypothesis that p q= .  Given
that this is a structural model and that rejection of efficient contracting could
arise because of misspecified objective functions even if this was the true
bargaining framework, one would like to see for what share of the school
districts in our sample would we be able (or unable) to reject the hypothesis that
implies efficient contracting.  To answer this question, we constructed tests of
the efficient contracting hypothesis p q= , as well as the hypothesis
underlying the labor demand models ( )q = 0 , at the school district level.  We
first calculated the fitted values of p and q and the variance-covariance matrix
of p and q for each school district, evaluated at the mean levels of the
exogenous variables school district by school district and making use of the
variance-covariance matrix of the model parameters estimated in the
unrestricted specifications42 .  Using this information, we first tested the
hypothesis q = 0 .  These results are shown in panel A of table 5.  Clearly, this
approach to modeling collective bargaining is inappropriate to the case of
school teachers.  In fact, the lowest t-statistic for the entire sample is 3.858
when t is unconstrained and 5.288 when t=1, and thus we are able to reject the
labor demand models for every one of the school districts in our sample at the
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 Svejnar (1986) failed to reject the hypothesis that union bargaining power was equal to 0.5 in his
private sector data set as well.
42 
 We applied the delta method to get a consistent estimator of the variance-covariance matrix of the
estimated p and q.
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99 percent confidence level.  It seems unlikely, even given the possibility of
misspecification of the objectives, that we would find such a resounding
rejection of labor demand models if they were in fact the appropriate way to
model collective bargaining in New York State public schools.
We next examined the relation between the estimated p and q values
on a school district by school district basis.  These results can be found in panel
B of table 5.  First of all, we found that the correlation coefficient between the
fitted p and q values was 0.620 when t is unconstrained and 0.685 when t=1.
Given that there were some coefficients in the p and q approximating equations
were of opposite sign, the lack of a higher degree of correlation is not
surprising.  Furthermore, when we directly tested the hypothesis that p q= ,
we were able to reject this hypothesis for 82.6% percent of the school boards in
our sample at the 95 percent level when t is freely estimated, 86.4% when t=1.
By reducing the confidence interval to 90 percent we were only able to reject an
additional 0.2% (0.7%) of the school boards. These results are not particularly
encouraging for efficient contracting models.  Although they may be due to
misspecification of the objective functions in equations (1) and (2), it seems
unlikely that, given the relatively general objective functions chosen, we should
reject the necessary condition for efficient contracting models so often if the
resource allocation generated by collective bargaining agreements in New York
State public schools was, in fact, Pareto efficient.
VII.D.  Other Results from the Structural Models
The empirical results concerning community demands for
education/distaste for taxes, i.e.  log γ
λ
  , appear to be consistent with results
found elsewhere in the literature.  For example, wealthier school districts and
school districts with larger enrollments appear to demand more educational
services, regardless of the assumptions that one makes on the manner in which
bargaining is carried out.  Furthermore, and also independent of the hypotheses
maintained during the estimation, we find that communities appear to demand
more education in school districts in which teachers have higher outside wages.
This suggests that we are indeed capturing some measure of human capital
with our outside wage measure, and that teachers who have characteristics
highly valued by the job market also tend to be highly valued by taxpayers of
their employing school districts.  We find no significant relation, regardless of
estimation method, between the share of students on welfare, the share of
minority students or the location in an SMSA on community preferences for
educational services or taxes. Similar results concerning the demand for
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teachers have been found elsewhere in the literature43 , so this result may be
unrelated to our particular estimation methodology.  There could be many
offsetting explanations for these non-results, including different taxation
schemes in areas where single-family housing is predominant or direct
transfers from the state or federal governments to school boards with
disproportionate shares of non-white or welfare-dependent students.
One surprising result is that school districts that expect future growth
appear to value current educational services significantly less than school
districts that will be experiencing zero or negative enrollment growth.  This
coefficient is significant in general at the 90% level, regardless of the
estimation method.  Since future enrollment in public schools is fairly easy to
predict by looking at current enrollment, the existing stock of preschool
children and number of finishing high school students, it is unlikely that this
result is due to irrational expectations.  Since future enrollment growth was
positive on average over the 3 sample years, one interpretation of this result
might be that the enrollment growth was unevenly distributed across school
districts, with the school districts whose residents dislike taxes the most
experiencing the fastest growth.  Another potential interpretation might be
based on the idea that school boards optimize dynamically under perceived
fixed budget constraints44 , and thus the anticipation of spending in the future
(tied to enrollment growth) might be offset by a reduction in current spending.
Finally, it seems interesting that although unions in more “republican”
school districts have higher bargaining power over employment, community
preferences for taxes are as expected.  Under all of the sets of maintained
hypotheses (except p=q, t=1), the share of the republican vote above the
statewide average is significantly negatively related to γ λ  at the 90% level at
worst, i.e. more republican school districts like taxes less.  Apparently, the
negative relation between the republican vote and community preferences is not
large enough to offset the positive relation between the republican vote and
bargaining power over employment in the linear approximation results.  Still,
our results seem consistent with the stereotype that more republican
communities seem to dislike school taxes significantly more than their less
republican counterparts.
The estimate of returns to scale in education (a) is safely in the bounds
necessary to obtain an interior solution to the theoretical model, and does
appear to be fairly robust to the specification of the model.  Using the estimate
of a it is possible to calculate the elasticity of employment with respect to
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 See, for example, Bergstrom et.  al (1982).
44 
 We have taken a static approach to modeling the collective bargaining, and thus this explanation is
not perfectly consistent with our modeling strategy.
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enrollment and school district wealth (as measured by the full value of property
per pupil).  This is done by multiplying the estimated coefficient by 1
1 − a
,
where a is the estimate of a.  For the least restricted case (p, q and t free), the
estimated elasticities of employment with respect to enrollment and wealth are
0.900 and 0.048 respectively. The estimated employment elasticity with respect
to enrollment is not far from that found in Currie (1991), whose estimates are
around 0.7.  This similarity in the elasticity estimates is reassuring, in that it
indicates that our structural approach to the econometric modeling, in addition
to allowing us to analyze more interesting aspects of the model estimated, does
not yield basic results outside the bounds of previous research.
VIII.  Measurement of Educational Services Provided
As mentioned in section II, using expenditures per pupil as the
measure of educational services provided to a community may not be correct
because the level of employment and wage in a school district are outcomes of
the bargaining process between the union and the school district.  To examine
how serious a problem this might pose to studies that attempt to model a
community’s demand for education, we ran a simple test based on two different
measures of expenditure per pupil45 .  The first is the observed teacher
expenditures in a school district per pupil 
Lw
Enrollment
  .  The second is the
“true value” of teacher services to the district per pupil, i.e.  expenditures on
teachers less the rent captured by the teachers’ union 
Lx
Enrollment
  .  The
two measures have a simple correlation of 0.905.  This is not surprising, given
the significance of the outside wage in the community preference
approximating function described in section VII.c. above.  However, one should
still be wary, since this high correlation does not imply that the size of the rent
captured is uncorrelated with other covariates that may be of interest.
In table 6, estimates from two specifications of a “typical” educational
demand function are presented using the uncorrected and corrected measures of
educational services per pupil.  While the choice of the measure of expenditure
per pupil does not cause the signs of coefficients to change, it does have a
significant effect on the estimated magnitude of the coefficients.  For example,
                                                       
45 
 Our measure of expenditure per pupil is not directly comparable with that found elsewhere in the
literature, in that we use only teaching expenditure per pupil and not the total expenditure per pupil as
our measure.  However, the results obtained are still meaningful, since teaching expenditures make up
the largest component of educational expenditures.
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moving from model 3 to model 4 we see the estimated wealth elasticity fall by
0.023, or roughly 25 percent.  The proportion of minority students and the
proportion of students on welfare, which seem to have a significant impact on
educational services rendered, are shown to be not significant when one
removes the rent-capture component from teacher wages.  Further, in the model
where the log of uncorrected measure is used it appears that changes in future
enrollment have an effect on current expenditures.  When the corrected
measure is used, one observes no significant effect.  Thus, it seems clear that
one should account for the endogenous nature of teacher salaries when
measuring expenditures per pupil.  The failure to do so may yield misleading
estimates of education demand function parameters.
IX.  Conclusion
In this paper, we developed a model of sequential bargaining over
wages and employment in the public sector.  This model yielded structural
employment and wage equations that were then estimated using data from a
sample of New York State teachers’ unions.  We were able to estimate union
bargaining power over wages and employment under the constraints of several
theoretical paradigms and in a relatively unconstrained manner.  Estimated
union bargaining power varies with the bargaining model applied (monopoly
union/right to manage, efficient contracting or inefficient contracting) and with
the assumptions made about risk preferences, but in the least constrained case
we estimate an average bargaining power over wages of around 0.53 and an
average bargaining power over employment of around 0.71. The results of our
structural model suggest that New York State’s teachers’ unions and school
districts do not engage in monopoly union or right to manage style bargaining,
nor does the vast majority of them engage in any sort of efficient contracting.
These results are confirmed by a series of linear approximations, which suggest
that the outcomes of collective bargaining agreements in New York State public
schools are indeed Pareto inefficient.  Finally, we find that one should worry
about the solidity of the employer’s threat point when modeling collective
bargaining in the public sector, as unions operating in school boards that have
to put their budgets up for a referendum vote by the community tend to have
significantly lower bargaining power than their counterparts in which the
budget is implemented without being subject to public approval.
Even contingent on the standard caveats about the risks of
misspecification error in structural modeling, the results of this paper should
not be viewed as being limited to a bargaining context.  In fact, this paper has
much to offer those interested in the factors affecting a community’s demand
for education.  As noted above, the level of wages and employment of teachers
in a school district is not something that is determined in a competitive market,
but rather as the outcome of a bargaining process.  In order to correctly
measure the level of educational services a school district consumes, it is
30
essential to account for the fact that wages and employment are endogenous.
Our estimation method offers a manner in which to approach this problem,
which is central to much of the research in the economics of education.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std.
Dev.
Wage (w) 710.608 159.113
Outside Wage (x) 446.212 82.896
Number of Teachers (L) 155.230 196.153
City School Districta 0.078 0.269
Relative Proportion of Vote Republican in Countya 8.11e-4 0.058
Percentage of Workers Covered by Collective
Agreement in Regiona
26.691 6.121
County Unemployment Ratea 6.903 2.546
Current Enrollment 2357.50 3204.80
Proportional Change in Enrollment in District 0.136 6.956
Full Value of Property per Pupil 168.209 229.741
Percentage of Students on Welfare 14.226 10.876
Number of Schools in District 4.206 4.953
Percentage of Non-white Students in District 5.516 12.829
School District in an SMSA 0.388 0.487
Percentage Average Daily Attendance 67.270 2.519
Observation from 1983 0.310 0.463
Observation from 1986 0.353 0.478
Observation from 1989 0.337 0.473
a: In the estimations, this variable is measured in terms of deviations from
overall means.  The value presented here is the mean of the pooled data from
which the deviations were calculated.
Notes: All monetary variables are in 1982 dollars.  There were 1491
observations.
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Table 2
Linear Employment Determination Model Results
 (Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Variable OLS1a OLS2b OLS3c IVd
Intercept -4.056
(1.073)
-4.321
(0.762)
-3.414
(0.807)
-3.275
(0.310)
Inside Wage (w) 0.668
(0.090)
0.668
(0.082)
0.924
(0.108)
0.277
(0.038)
Outside Wage (x) -0.198
(0.181)
-0.173
(0.072)
-0.514
(0.126)
0.042
(0.046)
Citye 0.103
(0.039)
0.102
(0.039)
0.086
(0.039)
0.049
(0.017)
Prop.
Republicane
0.304
(0.183)
0.275
(0.183)
0.173
(0.186)
0.171
(0.081)
Union Coveragee 8.91e-4
(2.08e-3)
4.25e-4
(2.08e-3)
1.03e-3
(2.07e-3)
7.87e-4
(8.66e-4)
Unemployment
Ratee
-0.024
(0.006)
-0.028
(0.006)
-0.028
(0.006)
-4.24e-3
(2.54e-3)
Log(Enrollment) 0.811
(0.015)
0.811
(0.015)
0.798
(0.015)
0.859
(0.006)
Change in
Enrollment
-1.80e-3
(1.23e-3)
-1.53e-3
(1.22e-3)
-1.36e-3
(1.22e-3)
7.17e-4
(5.16e-4)
Log(Full Value of
Property)
0.011
(0.011)
0.012
(0.011)
0.015
(0.011)
0.015
(0.004)
Pct.  Welfare -1.35e-4
(1.04e-3)
-6.00e-5
(1.03e-3)
-4.06e-4
(1.03e-3)
-6.70e-4
(4.40e-4)
Number of
Schools
0.013
(0.003)
0.013
(0.003)
0.013
(0.003)
6.41e-3
(1.15e-3)
Pct.  Non-white -2.41e-3
(9.16e-4)
-2.18e-3
(9.14e-4)
-1.38e-3
(9.35e-4)
1.01e-3
(4.00e-4)
Average Daily
Attendance
-5.85e-3
(5.81e-3)
-4.87e-3
(5.82e-3)
-6.85e-3
(5.79e-3)
-5.25e-3
(2.38e-3)
SMSA -0.069
(0.050)
-0.106
(0.029)
-0.069
(0.031)
-0.036
(0.014)
1986 0.077
(0.038)
0.068
(0.038)
0.095
(0.038)
1989 0.076
(0.057)
0.027
(0.049)
0.078
(0.049)
Number of
Observations
1748 1748 1746 1062
R2 0.874 0.875 0.875 0.984
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a: The outside wage used in this regression was estimated using school district-
specific work force characteristics and the coefficients from a preliminary
selection-corrected human capital regression (see section V for details).
b: The outside wage used in this regression is the county-wide average wage.
c: The outside wage used in this regression is the measure used in Currie
(1991), namely the average wage across all other school districts in the same
county.  There were two counties containing only one school district.
d: The wage is instrumented using the lagged wage and a year indicator.
Information on the lagged wage was missing the first observation for each
school district, and thus these observations were eliminated from the sample.
The outside wage used in this regression  was estimated using school district-
specific work force characteristics and the coefficients from a preliminary
selection-corrected human capital regression (see section V for details).
e: To facilitate interpretation of the results, this variable is included in the
regression as the deviation from its statewide mean.
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Table 3
Results from Estimating the Simultaneous Equations Structural Models
(Equations (8) and (9), Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Variable Model 1( )q = 0 Model 2a ( )p q= Model 3( )p q≠
t=1 t free t=1 t free t=1 t free
Cityb ( )p -0.249(0.070) -0.260(0.100) 0.216(.067) -.022(.020) .025(.063) -.001(.040)
Prop.
Republicanb ( )p
-2.64
(0.435)
-2.27
(0.843)
-0.755
(.319)
-.202
(.160)
-.871
(.321)
-.603
(.333)
Union
Coverageb ( )p
-0.002
(0.004)
-0.001
(0.005)
0.008
(.004)
-4.34e-4
(5.33e-4)
.008
(.004)
.005
(.003)
Unemployment
Rateb ( )p
0.067
(0.012)
0.072
(0.023)
-0.061
(.008)
.005
(.004)
-.054
(.008)
-.038
(.017)
1986 ( )p 1.06(0.109) 1.14(0.348) 0.517(.063) .069(.050) .523(.064) .338(.150)
1989 ( )p 0.425(0.094) 0.470(0.143) -0.045(0.069) 0.007(0.012) -0.031(0.067) -0.017(0.048)
Cityb ( )q - - 0.216(0.067) -0.022(0.020) 0.551(0.225) 0.539(0.238)
Prop.
Republicanb ( )q
- - -0.755
(0.319)
-0.202
(0.160)
3.61
(1.89)
5.20
(2.34)
Union
Coverageb ( )q
- - 0.008
(0.004)
-4.34e-4
(5.33e-4)
0.026
(0.013)
0.026
(0.014)
Unemployment
Rateb ( )q
- - -0.061
(0.008)
0.005
(0.004)
-0.200
(0.029)
-0.223
(0.039)
1986 ( )q - - 0.517(0.063) 0.069(0.050) 1.57(0.429) 1.43(0.408)
1989 ( )q - - -0.045(0.069) 0.007(0.012) 1.73(0.521) 1.66(0.485)
 Union preferences
(t)
1 0.932
(0.508)
1 6.29
(1.88)
1 2.11
(1.12)
Returns to Scale
( )α
0.516
(0.006)
0.514
(0.033)
0.480
(0.005)
0.742
(0.054)
0.480
(0.005)
0.559
(0.072)
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Variable Model 1 ( )q = 0 Model 2a ( )p q= Model 3 ( )p q≠
t=1 t free t=1 t free t=1 t free
Intercept ( )γ λ -0.693(0.568) -0.699(0.572) -1.09(0.616) -0.393(0.341) -1.06(0.610) -0.852(0.556)
Prop.  Republicanb ( )γ λ 0.252(0.117) -0.248(0.119) 0.109(0.112) -0.157(0.073) -0.443(0.236) -0.535(0.218)
Log(Enrollment) ( )γ λ 0.436(0.009) 0.438(0.031) 0.475(0.009) 0.233(0.049) 0.468(0.009) 0.398(0.065)
Change in Enrollment ( )γ λ -1.49e-3(8.17e-4) -1.50e-3(8.27e-4) -1.45e-3(8.87e-4) -7.73e-4(4.66e-4) -1.66e-3(8.84e-4) -1.44e-3(7.81e-4)
Log(Full Value of Property)( )γ λ
0.024
(0.006)
0.024
(0.006)
0.028
(0.006)
0.013
(0.004)
0.025
(0.006)
0.021
(0.006)
Pct.  Welfare ( )γ λ -3.28e-4(5.47e-4) -3.25e-4(5.52e-4) -4.76e-4(5.87e-4) -1.74e-4(3.01e-4) -3.96e-4(6.04e-4) -3.34e-4(5.18e-4)
Pct.  Non-white ( )γ λ -1.80e-4(4.63e-4) -1.82e-4(4.66e-4) 1.91e-4(5.00e-4) -1.33e-4(2.49e-4) -3.03e-4(5.06e-4) -2.64e-4(4.33e-4)
log(Outside wage) ( )γ λ 1.10(0.098) 1.10(0.098) 1.09(0.106) 1.06(0.053) 1.10(0.106) 1.09(0.091)
SMSA ( )γ λ -0.020(0.029) -0.020(0.029) -5.58e-4(3.13e-2) -0.011(0.016) -0.024(0.032) -0.021(0.028)
1986 ( )γ λ 0.208(0.015) 0.211(0.015) 0.095(0.014) 0.115(0.012) -0.066(0.042) -0.023(0.049)
1989 ( )γ λ 0.128(0.025) 0.131(0.026) 0.108(0.106) 0.047(0.019) -0.158(0.045) -0.124(0.046)
Iterations to Convergence 4 44 3 47 7 38
σ wage
2 0.015 0.015 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.013
σ employment
2 0.156 0.156 0.159 0.156 0.155 0.155
σ wage employment,
0.007 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007
System of Equations Mean
Squared Error
0.169 0.169 0.170 0.169 0.166 0.166
Adjusted R2 (Wage Equation) 0.682 0.682 0.722 0.689 0.720 0.720
Adjusted R2  (Employment
Equation)
0.831 0.832 0.829 0.832 0.832 0.834
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a: The estimated coefficients for both bargaining power approximating
equations are constrained to be identical and are shown as coefficients of both
the p and q approximating equations.
b: To facilitate interpretation of the results, this variable is included in the
regression as the deviation from its statewide mean.
Notes: There were 1491 observation used in estimating each of the
specifications. The outside wage used in all models was estimated using school
district-specific work force characteristics and the coefficients from a
preliminary selection-corrected human capital regression (see section V for
details).  In the models with t free, a grid search was performed over the range
[0,3] to find the optimal starting value for t.
39
Table 4
Means and Standard Deviations
of Fitted p and q Values
Model Specification p p q q
t=1  t estimated t=1  t estimated
Labor Demand
( )q = 0
0.622
(0.097)
0.631
(0.102)
- -
Strongly Efficient
( )p q=
0.539
(0.081)
0.507
(0.008)
0.539
(0.081)
0.507
(0.008)
Unrestricted
( )p q≠
0.541
(0.077)
0.527
(0.052)
0.716
(0.207)
0.705
(0.210)
Table 5
District by District T-tests on Estimated p and q
t-value Pct. of School
Districts
(t=1)
Pct.  of School
Districts
(t estimated)
Panel A t < 1 645. 0% 0%
H0: q = 0 1645 1 96. .≤ <t 0% 0%
196. ≤ t 100% 100%
Panel B t < 1 645. 13.0% 17.3%
H0: p q= 1645 1 96. .≤ <t 0.7% 0.2%
196. ≤ t 86.4% 82.6%
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 Table 6
Estimates of Education Demand Functions
Variable Model 1
(Uncorrected
Expenditure per
pupil)
Model 2
(Corrected
Expenditure per
pupil)
Model 3
(Uncorrected log
of Expenditure
per pupil)
Model 4
(Corrected log of
Expenditure per
pupil)
Intercept 2801.295
(659.780)
1043.509
(386.139)
7.612
(0.587)
6.704
(0.556)
Full Value of
Property per Pupil
0.677
(0.033)
0.403
(0.019)
- -
Log of Full Value
of Property per
Pupil
- - 0.091
(0.011)
0.068
(0.010)
Proportion of
Students on
Welfare
-8.627
(1.218)
-1.220
(0.715)
-2.92e-3
(1.09e-3)
-1.87e-4
(1.04e-3)
Proportion of
Republican Votea
104.546
(227.655)
201.657
(133.709)
0.172
(0.201)
0.332
(0.190)
Proportion of
Minority Students
6.144
(1.130)
0.952
(0.664)
6.31e-4
(1.00e-3)
-1.39e-3
(9.47e-4)
Average Daily
Attendance
-13.732
(7.255)
-1.092
(4.261)
-7.65e-3
(6.42e-3)
-1.78e-3
(6.08e-3)
County
Unemploymenta
-31.204
(6.956)
-3.488
(4.086)
-0.031
(0.006)
-0.020
(0.006)
Proportional
Change in
Enrollment
-7.963
(1.534)
-2.019
(0.901)
-3.48e-3
(1.32e-3)
-1.84e-3
(1.25e-3)
If in SMSA 401.457
(32.235)
328.387
(18.932)
0.159
(0.028)
0.243
(0.027)
1986 256.850
(45.915)
44.100
(26.967)
0.178
(0.041)
0.074
(0.038)
1989 640.460
(51.231)
400.857
(30.090)
0.339
(0.045)
0.335
(0.043)
R2 0.556 0.564 0.281 0.273
a: To facilitate interpretation of the results, this variable is included in the
regression as the deviation from its statewide mean.
Notes: All monetary variables are in 1982 dollars.  The mean of the
uncorrected expenditure per pupil is 2005.88 and the mean of the corrected
expenditure per pupil is 1275.83.  Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Appendix A
The Equivalence Between Differential Bargaining Power
over Wages and Employment and
Differential Preferences for Wages and Employment
Another potential interpretation of the structural model suggested by
the Manning approach is one in which, instead of allowing for different
bargaining powers over wages and employment, we assume the same
bargaining power over both wages and employment and allow the extra degree
of freedom to determine the relative weight that the union puts on the
employment relative to wage gains.  For example, consider the situation where
the school board, as before, has an objective function of the form
γ λαL wL−
while the union’s objective function is now
( )L w xβ τ τ β− −1 (3)
and the union’s bargaining power over both wages and employment is f.  Since
the bargaining power over employment and wages is now identical, we can now
solve a modified version of equation (3) for both employment and wages.  That
is, we want to solve
( )( ) ( )max
,w L
L w x L wLβ τ τ
β φ α φγ λ− −− −1 1 (A.1)
This gives, as a solution to the first-order conditions,
( )
( ) ( )[ ] ( )w x t=
+ −
− − − + −




φβ φ α
φ β β α φ α
τ1
1 1 1
1
(A.2)
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )[ ] ( )L x t=
+ −
+ −




+ −
− − − + −










− −
γ
λ
φβ φ α
φβ φ
φβ φ α
φ β β α φ α
τ
α
1
1
1
1 1 1
1
1
1
(A.3)
After some manipulation, we see that we can rewrite the parameters p and q of
the initial model as follows.
( )
( ) ( )( )p =
−
+ − − −
αφ β
α φ β α β
1
1 1
(A.4)
( )q = + −
φβ
φβ α1 (A.5)
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Thus there is clearly a degree of equivalence between the model with
differential bargaining powers and equal weights for the utility of wage gains
and employment in the union utility function (as presented in section III) and
the model with equal bargaining powers and differential weights on the utility
of wage gains and employment in the union utility function.
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 Appendix B
Results from Human Capital Regression*
Variable Mean Without Selection
Bias Correction
With Selection Bias
Correction
Intercept 1
(0)
2.652
(0.040)
2.288
(0.186)
Female 0.481
(0.500)
-0.451
(0.008)
-0.490
(0.021)
Age 37.813
(13.380)
0.118
(0.002)
0.121
(0.002)
Age2 1608.891
(1107.131)
-1.26e-3
(1.99e-5)
-1.28e-3
(2.16e-5)
If in SMSA 0.886
(0.318)
0.241
(0.012)
0.264
(0.017)
1986 0.399
(0.490)
-0.027
(0.009)
-0.047
(0.013)
1989 0.283
(0.450)
0.198
(0.011)
0.221
(0.016)
Primary School
Only
0.027
(0.162)
0.144
(0.031)
0.135
(0.031)
Between Primary
and High School
0.206
(0.404)
0.260
(0.023)
0.258
(0.023)
High School 0.300
(0.458)
0.516
(0.022)
0.523
(0.023)
Between High
School and BA /
BS
0.224
(0.417)
0.645
(0.023)
0.650
(0.023)
BA / BS 0.104
(0.306)
0.887
(0.024)
0.903
(0.026)
Between BA / BS
and Masters
0.047
(0.211)
0.974
(0.027)
0.972
(0.027)
Masters and
Beyond
0.059
(0.236)
1.037
(0.026)
1.054
(0.028)
Inverse Mills Ratio 1.292
(0.189)
- 0.202
(0.101)
Number of
Observations
26958 26958 26958
R2 0.387 0.387
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of real usual weekly earnings.  It has a
mean of 5.668 and a standard error of 0.794.  Standard errors are in
parentheses, except for the “Mean” column, in which case standard deviations
are in parentheses.
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